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Abstract 
Increasing environmental awareness may affect the pleasure of consuming a good for which 
an environmental friendly substitute is available. When deciding to buy differentiated 
products, a compromise is sometimes made between preferred characteristics of the good and 
its environmental properties. In this paper we investigate the market implication of product 
differentiation when customers are concerned about environmental aspects of the good. We 
use the spacial duopoly model to determine how environmental concern affects prices, 
product characteristics and market shares of the competing firms. Our analysis is based on a 
two-stage game where at the first stage each firm chooses the characteristic of its product. At 
the second stage each firm chooses its price. The unique equilibrium prices and market shares 
are affected by consumer awareness of the environment and by the higher costs for producing 
those goods. As for the Nash equilibria in the characteristics we find three equilibria 
depending on the parameter constellation. In order to find out whether the market functions in 
an optimal way we determined the choice of environmental characteristics by a welfare 
maximizing authority. The result of this analysis is that characteristics differ under private 
decision making and social one. It can be shown, however, that it is possible to choose 
environmental policy instruments in order to stimulate private firms to produce the social 
optimal qualities. 
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Price Competition and Product Differentiation when Consumers 
Care for the Environment 
 
 
 
 
1.       Introduction* 
Although nowadays ecologically relevant behavior is expected from a consumer, there are 
still consumers who buy canned beer or bottled juice under a no refund claim system instead 
of buying beverages under the deposit-refund system. Consumers also buy paper produced 
from trees instead of paper recovered from waste paper or normal food instead of eco- or bio-
food. They buy cars with a big engine and a bad mileage per liter gasoline instead of a three-
liter car. They prefer to use the airplane instead of the train although of a relatively short 
travel distance, they purchase conventional bulbs instead of electricity saving bulbs or they 
prefer energy-inefficient halogen light instead of neon tubes. Consumers’ individual decisions 
are based on utility maximizing behavior, but there is a trade-off between utility derived from 
preferred characteristics of a product and between the moral behavior of buying “green”, 
expected by part of the society. There is product differentiation with respect to environmental 
friendly characteristics with positive market shares for producers who care about these 
characteristics and for producers who don’t. If a consumer buys a product which lacks any 
environmental friendly characteristics, he might have a bad conscience because environmental 
awareness is expected from him. His environmental attitude is influenced by friends, parents, 
partners, or by the media, but it is often not strong enough to push the market share of 
environmentally incompatible products towards zero and that one of the environmentally 
friendly substitute towards one. One reason is that producers are aware of the conflict of 
consumers between preferred characteristics and their environmental incompatibility. They 
know that customers, getting their preferred characteristics from an environmentally friendly 
product, welcome that coincidence but if environmental aspects are missing, they might 
anyhow buy the product.  
Producers respond to consumer’s utility from a product and his disutility from not 
being environmentally friendly in various ways. In addition to offering different 
characteristics, producers can choose prices such as to prevent the loss of market shares. 
 
* I am grateful to Peter Hasfeld for helpful suggestions. 
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A price could be attractive to the consumer because characteristics of the product offered are    
similar. In that case, price competition is high. But consumers may also accept higher prices 
because environmentally friendly products are costlier to produce, making these products 
more expensive. We will develop a standard model of price competition and product 
differentiation1 incorporating the aforementioned environmental awareness of the consumers. 
The model is similar in spirit to a paper by Grilo, Shy and Thisse (2001) in which equilibrium 
prices are determined when consumer behavior is characterized by phenomena like 
conformity or vanity.2 We will describe market equilibria in which firms choose the 
characteristics of their respective  products as well as their prices. Our analysis is based on a 
two-stage non-cooperative game. In the first stage, each firm chooses the characteristic of its 
product (more or less environmental friendly). Then, having observed its rival’s 
characteristics, in the second stage of the game each firm chooses its price. The set of players 
therefore consists of two firms and a continuum of potential customers represented by the unit 
interval. They choose from which firm to buy having observed prices and characteristics. 
Our objective is to confront our results with those derived in the literature on price 
competition through product differentiation (e.g. Shaked and Sutton (1982)). In these models 
the two firms will choose distinct qualities and both will enjoy positive profits at equilibrium. 
The intuitive idea behind this result is that, as their qualities become close, price competition 
between the increasingly similar products reduces the profit of both firms. The open question 
is whether under environmental awareness the equilibrium will be still unique, whether 
product differentiation will be maximal, and whether profits will be still positive when the 
costs of production increase with quality, i.e. with environmental properties. The paper is 
organized as follows. In section 2 we present the model of price and product differentiation 
and characterize the Nash equilibria. In section 3 we look for social welfare maximizing 
environmental characteristics and for policy instruments to affect firms’ decisions on 
characteristics towards social ones. Section 4 concludes the paper. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1  The standard model has been set out by D’Aspremont et al. (1979) by correcting Hotelling’s (1929) “principle 
of minimum differentiation”. They show that no equilibrium price solution exists when both sellers are not far 
enough from each other. They consider a slightly modified version of Hotelling’s model for which there exists a 
price equilibrium solution everywhere. In this version there is a tendency for both sellers to maximize their 
differentiation. 
2 See also a model of social distance by Akerlof (1997) that is useful for understanding social decisions.  
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2. The model 
We consider an oligopolistic (duopolistic) market where the two firms compete not only in 
prices but also in quality. Quality here means that the product differs in terms of its 
environmental characteristics. When the firm decides on the degree of environmental 
friendliness of its product, it has to anticipate the strategic effects of its decision on price and 
attribute of its competitor’s product. Our non-cooperative game considers two stages: In the 
first stage the firms simultaneously choose their respective characteristics. In the second stage 
they compete in prices. At this stage the characteristics are fixed and irreversible, so that price 
competition is influenced by the degree of product differentiation. Firms will take this into 
account when deciding on the characteristics. Our model differs from standard models of 
product differentiation because of the introduction of a consumption externality. The model is 
in spirit of models of social interaction in which individuals care about status (belonging to 
the group of environmentally concerned people) as well as “intrinsic utility” which refers to 
utility derived directly from consumption.3 We consider two firms selling a heterogeneous 
product with characteristics [ ]0,1 , 1, 2iq i∈ = , with 1 2q q≤ . The products are labeled in 
increasing order of environmental friendliness, i.e. firm 1 is less concerned about not 
producing environmentally friendly goods. In our model of horizontal product differentiation 
each consumer buys one unit of the product. There is a continuum of consumers uniformly 
distributed over the interval [0, 1]. The willingness to pay of consumer [ ]0,1θ ∈  for a unit of 
the good of property q is defined by: 
 
(1)  ( ) ( ) ( )2, 1v q r t q d qθ θ= − − − −  
 
in which r stands for the gross, intrinsic utility a consumer derives from consuming one unit 
of the product. In the tradition of spacial models of product differentiation, it is assumed that r 
is sufficiently large to ensure that all consumers prefer buying rather than dropping out of the 
market. The term ( )2t q θ−  represents the costs a consumer, located at [ ]0,1θ ∈ , bears if he 
does not get his preferred characteristic’s because he has to buy from firm i selling 
characteristic’s ( )1, 2iq i = . With ( )1 id q−  we express the social status of the consumer. It is 
modeled by the bad conscious of not having purchased the environmentally most friendly 
product at the end of the characteristic’s [0, 1] line. When environmental awareness is 
                                                 
3 See Bernheim (1994). 
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sufficiently important relative to intrinsic utility, many individuals conform to a single 
homogeneous standard of behavior, despite heterogeneous underlying preferences. Social 
groups often penalize individuals who deviate from accepted norms, even when deviations are 
relatively minor.4 We incorporate environmental concern directly into individual preferences. 
There are at least three separate justifications for doing this. First, the assumption that 
individuals care about the environment is consistent with evidence. Second, evolutionary 
pressures could well produce preferences of this form. Third, deviations from social 
environmental awareness are punished by loss of social “reputation” (not being “in”).5 The 
utility of consumer θ  when buying from i is then defined by  
 
(2)  ( ) ( ) ( )2, 1i i i iU q r t q d q pθ θ= − − − − −  
 
where ip  is the price of firm i (i = 1, 2). The utility (2) captures different types of product 
differentiation together with a social externality.6 The consumer feels he should consider to 
buy “green” but his preferences are different. Social pressure as an externality compels him to 
incorporate environmental aspects into his preferences.  
 The market is modeled as a two-stage game, the solution of which is given by a 
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. In the first stage, firms select their 
characteristics. In the second one, given any pair of characteristics, the firms choose their 
prices. By backwards induction we want to determine for a given pair of characteristics 
( )1 2,q q  all the price pairs for which both firms have a strictly positive demand. We therefore 
are interested in finding a consumer ( )ˆ 0,1θ ∈  who is indifferent between the two suppliers, 
given their prices ( )1 2,p p . For that, θˆ  must satisfy the following equation: 
 
(3)  ( ) ( )1 2ˆ ˆ, ,U q U qθ θ= . 
 
Using (2) and solving (3) for θˆ  yields: 
 
                                                 
4 See Bernheim (1994) for a model of social interaction in which individuals care about status as well as 
“intrinsic” utility. 
5 In the status model by Akerlof (1997), the individual chooses a status-producing variable x to maximize an 
utility function ( )( )U u x d x x= − ⋅ −?  where the person loses utility in amount ( )d x x−?  insofar as she falls 
behind everyone else in her choice of x where x?  is the choice of everyone else.   
6 See Grilo, Shy and Thisse (2001). 
 6
(4)  
( )
( )
*
2 1 2 1 1 2
2 1
ˆ
2
p p t q q q q d
t q q
θ  − + − + − = −  
 
where *d d t= . Under horizontal product differentiation consumers split their purchase 
between the two firms when they offer their product at the same price. Setting 1 2p p=  in (4) 
implies *1 20 2q q d< + − <  as a condition for horizontal product differentiation. For 
consumers with ˆθ θ< , it is ( ) ( )1 1 2 2, ,v q p v q pθ θ− > − ; i.e. they buy the product of firm 1. 
Consumers with ˆθ θ>  buy the product of firm 2 as for them ( ) ( )1 1 2 2, ,v q p v q pθ θ− < − . The 
firm specific demand functions are therefore  
 
(5)  ( ) ( )1 1 2 2 1 2ˆ ˆ, , , 1D p p D p pθ θ= = −  
 
for firm 1 and firm 2, respectively.  
 In producing the two characteristics we assume that costs increase in q. 
Environmentally friendly products incur higher costs to produce them. Profits are then defined 
as follows: 
 
(6)  [ ] ( ) [ ] ( )1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 1 2, , ,p c q D p p p c q D p pπ π= − = −  
 
where c in i i iC c q D= ⋅ ⋅  is a constant. From the FOCs for a profit-maximizing price strategy 
we obtain the following reaction functions: 
 
(7)  ( ) ( ){ }*1 1 2 2 2 1 1 2 112Rp p p p t q q q q d c q = = + − + − +   
 
(8)   ( ) ( ){ }*2 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 21 22Rp p p p t q q q q d c q = = + − − − + +  . 
 
Firm i's best response on the price of its competitor depends on the characteristics chosen by 
the firms at the first stage of the game. Solving the reaction functions for 1p  and 2p  yields 
the unique equilibrium prices: 
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(9)  ( ) ( )* *1 2 1 1 2 2 11 2 23p t q q q q d c q q  = − + + − + +    
 
(10)   ( ) ( )* *2 2 1 1 2 1 21 4 23p t q q q q d c q q  = − − − + + +   . 
 
Since for horizontal product differentiation *1 20 2q q d< + − < , prices are positive. Evaluating 
the marginal consumer (4) at the price equilibrium, we have  
 
(11)  ( )
*
1 2*
1 1 2
2
,
6
t q q d c
d q q
t
θ  + + − + = =  
 
(12)  ( )
*
1 2*
2 1 2
4
1 ,
6
t q q d c
d q q
t
θ  − − + − − = = . 
 
 
Proposition  
Consumer awareness of the environment, d, lowers the price *1p  and raises the price 
*
2p . The 
market share of firm 1 will decline and the one of firm 2 will increase, i.e. 
 
 
( )** * *1 2
* * * *
1
0, 0, 0, 0p p
d d d d
θθ ∂ −∂ ∂ ∂< > < >∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ .  
 
Second, higher costs of production, c, reduces the market share of the environmentally 
concerned firm 2. Both firms raise their prices but the price increase of firm 2 is higher than 
the one of firm 1. The spread of their prices increase and depends on the difference in product 
differentiation   
 
  
( ) ( ) ( )* * ** * 2 11 2 2 11 10, , 3
p pp p q q
c c c c
θ ∂ − ∂ −∂ ∂ < < = − ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ 
. 
 
These conclusions only hold if 1q  and 2q  are fixed. When choosing the characteristics at the 
first stage of the game, firms take into account the effect of their quality decisions on the 
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price, set at the second stage. Profit of firm i is ( ) ( ) ( )*1 2 1 2 1 2, , ,i i i iq q p q q c q d q qπ  = − ⋅   and 
depends on the characteristics ( )1 2,q q . We consider first the case of an interior solution 
0 1iq≤ ≤  and solve the FOCs 0i
iq
π∂ =∂  in terms of two reaction functions. The result is  
 
(13)  ( ) * *1 1 2 21 23Rq q q d q c = = − + + −   
 
(14)    ( ) * *2 2 1 11 43Rq q q d q c = = + + −   
 
where *d d t=  and *c c t= . It is well known that in the conventional case ( )0d c= =  there 
exists no interior solution. Both firms choose maximal product differentiation by producing 
1 0q =?  and 2 1q =? . Solving the simultaneous system (13) and (14) yields 
 
(15)  ( )* *1 1 14 2q d c= − + −?  
 
(16)   ( )* *2 5 14 2q d c= + −? . 
 
An interior solution for 1 0q ≥?  would require * * 12d c− ≥ , and for 2 1q ≤?  the inequality 
* * 1
2
d c− ≤ − . We conclude that there exists no interior Nash equilibrium in characteristics.  
 We next characterize three equilibria of ( )1 2,q q , depending on the difference * *d c− . 
 
Case (i): * * 1
2
d c− ≥  
It is 1 0q ≥?  from (15) and 2 1q =?  as 2q  must not exceed one. According to (13), the best 
response of firm 1 on 2 1q =?  is * *1 1(1) 13
Rq d c = − + −   which implies 1 0q ≥  if * * 1d c− ≥ . 
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The best response of firm 2 on 1 (1)
Rq  follows from (14). It is 
( ) ( )* *2 2 1 11 4(1) 19 9R Rq q q d c= = + − >  that is, firm 2 sticks to 2 1q =? . We conclude: 
Proposition 2: 
If  ( )* * 1 . .d c i e d c t− ≥ − ≥ ,    then 
 
(17)  
* * *
1
*
2
1 1 0
3
1
q d c
q
 = − + − ≥ 
=
 
 
is a Nash equilibrium in the characteristics 1q  and 2q . 
 
Case (ii): * * 1
2
d c− ≤ −  
It is 2 1q ≤?  from (16) and 1 0q =?  as 1q  can not become negative. The best response (14) of 
firm 2 on 1 0q =?  is * *2 1(0) 43
Rq d c = + −   with 2 (0) 1Rq ≤  if * * 1d c− ≤ − . The best response 
of firm 1 on 2 (0)
Rq  is in turn ( ) ( )* *1 2 1(0) 2 4 09R Rq q d c = − + − <   with * * 1d c− ≤ − ; that is 
1 0q =? . We conclude: 
 
Proposition 3: 
If  ( )* * 1 . .d c i e d c t− ≤ − − ≤ − ,   then 
(18)  
*
1
* * *
2
0
1 4 1
3
q
q d c
=
 = + − ≤ 
 
is a Nash equilibrium in ( )1 2,q q . 
 
Case (iii): * *1 1
2 2
d c− ≤ − ≤  
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It is 1 20, 1q q= =? ? . The best response of firm 2 on 1 0q =?  is * *2 1(0) 43
Rq d c = + −   with 
2 (0) 1
Rq >  if * * 1d c− > − . In that case it is 2 1Rq = . The best response of firm 1 on 2 1Rq =  is 
* *
1
1(1) 1
3
Rq d c = − + −   with 1 (1) 0Rq <  if * * 1d c− < . We conclude: 
 
 
Proposition 4: 
If   ( )* *1 1 . .d c i e t d c t− < − < − < − < ,  then 
(19)   * *1 20 1q q= =  
is a Nash equilibrium in ( )1 2,q q . 
 The market shares in our three cases can be determined by inserting * *1 2,q q  in (11) and 
(12): 
 
(20)      
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
* * * * * * * *
* * * * * * * *
* * * * * * * *
4 1 5 11) 4 1 : , 1
9 9 9 9
5 1 4 12) 4 1 : , 1
9 9 9 9
1 1 1 13) 1 1 : , 1 .
2 6 2 6
d c d c d c
d c d c d c
d c d c d c
θ θ
θ θ
θ θ
≥ − ≥ = − − − = + −
− ≤ − ≤ − = − − − = + −
− < − < = − − − = + −
 
   
As expected, environmental awareness reduces the market share of firm 1 and increases the 
market share of good 2. The same effect has a lower unit cost c. In Table 1 we present the 
characteristics, prices, market shares and profit for our three Nash-equilibria. As values for 
* *d c−  we choose an upper bound, a lower bound and an intermediate value (we set 1t =  for 
simplification).  
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 Table 1: Market structure and performance in the three Nash equilibria (t = 1) 
 
d c−  *
1q  
*
2q  
*
1p  
*
2p  
*θ  *1π  *2π  
1. Nash eq.        
( )
4
4
d c t
d c
− =
= +  
1 1 c  c  0  0  0  
( )
2
2
d c t
d c
− =
= +  
1 3 1 3 8 27c +  28 27c +  2 9  0.066 0.806 
( )1
d c t
d c
− =
= +  
0  1 2 3  4 3c +  1 3 2 9  8 9  
2. Nash eq.        
( )1
d c t
d c
− = −
= −  
0 1 4 3  2 3c +  2 3  8 9  2 9  
( )
2
2
d c t
d c
− = −
= −  
0 2 3  28 27  2 3 8 27c + 7 9  0.806 0.065 
( )
4
4
d c t
d c
− = −
= −  
0 0 0 0  1 0 0 
3. Nash eq.        
( )
2
1 2
d c t
d c
− =
= +  
0 1 5 6  7 6c +  11 24  0.382 0.632 
( )
0d c
d c
− =
=  
0 1 1 1c +  1 3 1 3 2 3  
( )
2
1 2
d c t
d c
− = −
= −  
0 1 7 6  5 6c +  13 24  0.632 0.382 
 
 
 
3. Social welfare maximizing characteristics 
The next step is to check for market failure in the sense that the private choice of the 
characteristics might differ from the social optimal one preferred by an environmental 
authority. For that purpose we define social welfare as a function of 1q  and 2q . It is equal to 
the aggregate willingness to pay minus cost of production. Therefore 
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(21)   
1
2 2
1 2 1 1 1 2 2 2
0
( , ) ( ) (1 ) ( ) (1 )W q q r t q d q cq d r t q d q cq d
θ
θ
θ θ θ θ   = − − − − − + − − − − −   ∫ ∫
?
?
 
 
The market share θ?  separates the consumers with higher welfare from 1q  from those wilt 
higher welfare from 2q . It is determined by the consumer being indifferent between welfare 
from 1q  and welfare from 2q : 
 
2 2
1 1 1 2 2 2( ) (1 ) ( ) (1 )r t q d q cq r t q d q cqθ θ− − − − − = − − − − −
? ?
 
 
This condition yields 
 
  * *1 2
1 ( )
2
q q d cθ = + − +?  
 
For maximizing welfare in (21) with respect to 1q  and 2q , we first integrate W with respect to 
θ , and then we set the partial derivatives 
1
W
q
∂
∂  and 2
W
q
∂
∂  equal to zero. Solving the two FOCs 
for 1q  and 2q  yields the characteristics which maximize social welfare
7: 
 
(22)  
* *
1
1ˆ
2 4
d cq −= + , 
* *
2
3ˆ
2 4
d cq −= + . 
 
Inserting these values in θ? , given above, yields 1
2
θ =? . In the conventional case ( 0),d c= =  
it is 1
1ˆ
4
q = , 2 3ˆ 4q =  and 
1
2
θ = . Each firm should produce the optimal quality of that 
consumer who is located in the middle of the corresponding market segment of the firm8. 
Compared with the private choice in that case, i.e. * *1 20,  1,q q= =  private competition leads to 
an extreme product differentiation relative to the social optimum. In our case ( 0,  0),d c> >  
we have to compare the three Nash equilibria * *1 2( , )q q  with the corresponding social pair 
1 2ˆ ˆ( , )q q  to find out whether private and social characteristics differ.  
                                                 
7 See the Appendix for mathematical details. 
8 See Bester, p. 116 for the conventional case. 
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Let us consider the first Nash equilibrium in (17). Since * * 1,d c− ≥  it is *2 2ˆ 1,q q= =  but 
*
1 1ˆq q≠ . In order to achieve that *1q  is equal to 1qˆ , we have to introduce a policy parameter as 
an incentive for firm 1 to produce 1qˆ . One possibility is to set 0c c s= −  where s could be a 
subsidy ( 0)s >  or a tax ( 0)s <  on the unit cost of production. Private calculations are now 
based on 0c c s= − , social welfare calculations on 0c c= . We are interested in finding a value 
of s such that *1 1ˆ( )q s q= , i.e. 
 
(23)  
* *
* * 0 0
1 1
1 1 ˆ( ) 1
3 2 4
c s d cq s d q
t
− − = − + − = + =   . 
 
This condition is satisfied for  
 
(24) 07
4 2
d cs t −= + . 
 
In order to check whether s is a subsidy or a tax, we substitute s from (24) into the parameter 
condition for case (i), i.e. into 0( )4 1d c s
t
− −≥ ≥  and obtain 032 2
tt d c≥ − ≥ − . Therefore s is 
positive and a subsidy on the cost of production. Since *1 1ˆq q<  without a subsidy, 0s >  is an 
incentive for firm 1 to raise the environmental characteristics of its product. Firm 2 benefits 
from this policy because it gets also the subsidy but produces already the highest 
environmental characteristic *2 1ˆ1( ).q q= =  
An alternative policy to raise *1q  could be to launch a campaign to raise environmental 
awareness (d) of the consumers by δ  (advertising, TV sports, etc.). The equivalent condition 
to (23) is 
 
* *
*
1 1
1 1 ˆ( ) 1
3 2 4
d c d cq q
t
δδ + − − = − + = + =   . 
 
The required impact on environmental awareness is then 
 
* *7 0
4 2
d ctδ −= + >  
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which is positive since * * 1d c− ≥ . 
Let us next consider the second Nash equilibrium in (18). Since * * 1d c− ≤ − , it is 
*
1 1ˆq q=  but *2 2ˆq q≠ . Similarly as before we have to find a s such that  
(25)  
*
* * 0 0
2 2
1 3 ˆ( ) 4
3 2 4
c s d cq s d q
t
− − = + − = + =   . 
 
Since without an incentive s, *2 2ˆq q> , we expect a tax ( )0s < . Solving (25) for s yields 
 
(26)  
* *
* 9
2 4
d cs −= −  
 
where * /s s t= . If we substitute *s  into the parameter conditions for case (iii), i.e.  
* * *
04 ( ) 1d c s− ≤ − − ≤ − , we obtain * *07 56 6d c− ≤ − ≤ , that is, 
* 0s < , a tax on production. We 
could think of two firms, one produces electricity with a coal-fired power plant, the other one 
with wind energy. From the social point of view there might be too much wind energy 
because its installation ruins the landscape *2 2ˆ( )q q> . A tax on electricity would correct this 
private outcome. Since firm 1 produces *1 0q = , it has no costs ( )*0 1( ) 0c s q− ⋅ =  and is 
therefore not affected by the tax.  
We could also think of affecting d by d δ+ . If we replace d in (25) by  d δ+  and 
solve for δ , we obtain a negative δ 9. The government announces that global warming is not 
caused by carbon dioxide emissions (coal-fired power plants) and that there is no reason to 
disfigure the landscape by economic inefficient wind mills. 
Finally, if the third Nash equilibrium occurs * *1 2( 0, 1)q q= = , there is no way to 
influence the firms to produce the social optimal environmental qualities 1qˆ  and 2qˆ  in (22). 
The only possibility is to affect d or c in the corresponding interval * *1 1d c− < − <  such that 
the private outcome is one of the other two Nash equilibria. Since one policy parameter is 
needed to end up in another equilibrium and another policy parameter to adjust private 
environmental qualities to the social ones, a campaign has to be launched as well as a tax or 
subsidy to be paid to achieve the social outcome. 
                                                 
9  It is 
* * 7
2 4
d cδ −= −  and negative because of  * * 1d c− ≤ − . 
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4. Summary and conclusion 
Increasing environmental awareness may affect the pleasure of consuming a good for which 
an environmental friendly substitute is available. When deciding to buy differentiated 
products, a compromise is sometimes made between preferred characteristics of the good and 
its environmental properties. In this paper we have investigated the market implication of 
product differentiation when customers are concerned about environmental aspects of the 
good. We have used the spacial duopoly model to determine how environmental concern 
affects prices, product characteristics and market shares of the competing firms.  
 We first have solved the second stage of the game, that is, price competition when 
differences in quality exists. The unique equilibrium prices and market shares are affected by 
consumer awareness of the environment and by the higher costs for producing those goods. 
We next determined the characteristics at the first stage of the game when firms take into 
account the effect of their quality decisions on profit, price and hence on market shares. We 
found no interior Nash equilibrium 1 20 , 1q q> <? ?  but three Nash equilibria of the type 
( ) ( )* * * *1 2 1 20, 1 , 0, 1q q q q> = = <  and ( )* *1 20, 1q q= = , depending on the parameter 
constellations. The market share of the environmental good increases in each type with 
environmental concern and it declines if costs are higher to produce those goods.  
 In order to find out whether the market functions in an optimal way we have to 
compare the private decisions on quality with the choice of quality by a welfare maximizing 
authority. We found that the social welfare maximizing characteristics are not the same than 
the quality distribution by private firms in the three Nash equilibria. It is, however, possible to 
choose environmental policy instruments to stimulate private firms to produce the social 
optimal quality distribution. Depending on the type of the Nash equilibrium, the government 
can either choose a subsidy on costs or can launch a campaign in favor of environmental 
awareness, or it can raise the cost of a product by a tax or can announce its environmental 
irrelevance if producers care more for the environment than is socially justified.   
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Appendix 
 
Proof of (22): 
 
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( )
2* *
1 1
0
1 1
2* * * *
1 2 2 2
0 0
1
1
W r q d q d
t
c q d r q d q d c q d
θ
θ
θ
θ θ
θ θ θ θ
= − − − −
− + − − − − −
∫
∫ ∫ ∫
?
?
?
 
 
where   * * *, ,r d cr d c
t t t
= = = . 
 
Integrated: 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
3* * * *
1 1 1
0
1
3* * *
2 2 2
1 1
3
1 1
3
W r q d q c q
r q d q c q
θ
θ
θ θ θ θ
θ θ θ θ
 = + − − − −  
 + + − − − −  
?
?
 
 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
3* * * * 3
1 1 1 1
33* * * * *
2 2 2 2 2 2
1 11
3 3
1 11 1 1 .
3 3
W r q d q c q q
r q d q c q r q d q c q
θ θ θ θ
θ θ θ θ
⇒ = + − − − − −
+ + − − − − − − − + − +
? ? ?
? ? ? ?
 
 
 
FOC with respect to 1q : 
 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
* 2 * * *
1 1
1
2* 2 * *
1 1 2 2 2
1 11 1
2 2
1 1 1 11 0
2 2 2 2
W q d d q c
q
c q q q d q c q
θ θ θ
θ
∂  = − − + − − − ∂  
 − − − − − + − + =  
? ? ?
?
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( )
( ) ( )
2* * *
* *1 2
2
2* ** *
2 2 1
1 2 1 2
1 1
2 2 2
1 1 0
2 2 2 2
q q d c dd q c
q q d cc dq q q q
θ θ − + −⇒ + − − −  
 − + −− − − + + − =  
? ?
 
 
 
( )( )
( ) ( )( )
* * * * *
1 2 1 2 1
* * 2 * * * * *
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
1 2
4
12 2 0
4
q q d c q q d c d d q
c c q q q q q d c q q d c d q
θ
θ
⇒ − + − − + − + +
− − − − + − + − − + − − =
?
?
 
 
 
2 * * 2 * * * * *2 * *
1 1 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 1
* * * *2 * * *2 * * * * * * * *2 *
2 1 2 1 1 2 1
* 2 2 * * 2 * * * *
2 1 2 1 2 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 2 1
*2 * *
1
4
12
4
q q q d q c q q q q d q c q d q d q d d c c q
c q d c c d q d q d d c d q c q c q c d c c q
c q q q q q d q c q q q q d q c q d q d q
d c d
⇒ − + − − + − + + − + − −
+ − + + + − + + − − + − −
+ − + − + − − + − + + −
+ − * * * * *2 *2 1 2 0q c q c d c c d q− + − + − =
 
 
 
2 2 *2 * * *2
1 1 2 2
* *2 * * * *2 2
1 1 1
1 2 4 2 2 4 2
4
2 2 2 2 0
q q q q d d c c
d q d d c c q c q
 ⇒ − + + − + 
+ − + − − − =
 
 
 
2 2 *2 * * *2 *
1 1 2 2 1
*2 * * * *2 2
1 1
1 1 1 1 2
2 2 2 2
2 2 2 0
q q q q d d c c d q
d d c c q c q
⇒ − + + − + +
− + − − − =
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
( )2 *2 *22 * * * *21 1 2 1 13 2 2 0 A2 2 2 2
q d cq q q d c d q c q− − + − + − + − =⇒ 
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FOC with respect to 2q : 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
* 2 2* * * *
1 2 1 2
2
*2 * * * 2
2 2
1 1 11 1
2 2 2
1 11 0
2 2 2
W q d q c q q d c
q
c qq d d q c
θ
θ θ θ
∂ = − − − − − + − + −∂
− − − + − + + =
?
? ? ?
 
 
 
 
2* * * *
2 *1 2 1 1
2 2
2* * * * *2 * *
* 2 1 1 2
* * * ** * *2
2 1 2 2
1 2 1
2 2 2 2
1
2 2 2 2 2 2
0
2 2 2 2 2 2
q q d c d q c q q q d
q q d c d q d q d d cc
d q c q c q c qc d c
 − + −⇒ − + − + − + +  
 − + −− − − − + −  
− + + − + + =
 
 
 
 
 
( )
( )( )
2* * 2 * *
1 2 2 2
* * * * * *2 * * * *2
2 1 2 1 2 2
1 2 4 2 2 2
4
1 2 2 2 0
4
q q d c q q d c
q q d c q q d c d q d d c c q c
⇒ − − + − + − + + −
− − + − − + − − + − + + =
 
 
 
 
 
( )2 2 *2 * * *2 2 * *1 1 2 2 2 2
* *2 * * * *2
2 2
1 2 4 2 2 4 2 2 4 2 1
4
2 2 2 0
q q q q d d c c q q d c
d q d d c c q c
 ⇒ − − + + − + + − + + − 
− + − + + =
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Next we add (A) + (B): 
 
                2 * * 2 * * * *1 1 2 2 2 2( ) 2 (1 ) 0q q d c q q d c d q c q − − − − + − − − + =   
 
 
 
* * * * 2
2 * * * *
1 2 2 2 2
( ) 2 (1 )
2 4
d c d cq q q d c d q c q− −  = ± + − + + − − +   
 
  
 
* * * *
1 2 12 2 2
d c d cq q
 −= ± − + −  
 
 
 
 (C)                                               21 21 0q q= − + ≤    
 
 
1
1q  inserted into (A) yields: 
 
2 *2 *22* * * * * *2
2 2 2
* * * * * *
2 2
3 1 1
2 2 2 2
2 ( 1) 2 ( 1) 0
q d cd c q d c q q d c
d d c q c d c q
   − − − + − − − + + − + − +   
− − + − − − + =
 
 
 
 
* *
2
3
2 4
d cq −= +  
 
        
 
* *
1
1
2 4
d cq −= +  
 
 
 
 
 
( ) ( )
2 *2 *2
2 * *1
1 2 2 2
* * * *
2 2
3 4
2 2 2 2
2 1 2 2 0 B
q d cq q q d c q
d c d q c q
− + + + − + −
+ + − − + =
⇒ 
⇒ 
⇒ 
1 * *
1 2 1q d c q= − − +⇒ 
⇒ 
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